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 ABSTRACT 
 
Private for-profit institutions have been the fastest growing part of the U.S. higher 
education sector.  For-profit enrollment increased from 0.2 percent to 9.1 percent of total 
enrollment in degree-granting schools from 1970 to 2009 and for-profit institutions account for 
the majority of enrollments in non-degree granting postsecondary schools.  We describe the 
schools, students, and programs in the for-profit higher education sector, its phenomenal recent 
growth, and its relationship to the federal and state governments.  Using the 2004 to 2009 
Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) longitudinal survey we assess outcomes of a recent 
cohort of first-time undergraduates who attended for-profits relative to comparable students who 
attended community colleges or other public or private non-profit institutions.  We find that 
relative to these other institutions, for-profits educate a larger fraction of minority, 
disadvantaged, and older students, and they have greater success at retaining students in their 
first year and getting them to complete short programs at the certificate and AA levels.  But we 
also find that for-profit students end up with higher unemployment and “idleness” rates and 
lower earnings six years after entering programs than do comparable students from other schools, 
and that they have far greater student debt burdens and default rates on their student loans. Private for-profit institutions have become an increasingly visible part of the U.S. higher 
education sector.  They are today the most diverse by program and size, have been the fastest 
growing, have the highest fraction of nontraditional students, and obtain the greatest proportion 
of their total revenue from federal student aid (loan and grant) programs.  They are, as well, the 
subjects of high-profile investigations of late and are facing major regulatory changes. 
Today’s for-profit postsecondary schools were preceded a century ago by a group of 
proprietary schools that were also responding to an explosion in demand for technical, vocational 
and applied subjects.  Business, managerial, and secretarial skills were in great demand in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a multitude of proprietary institutions emerged 
that taught accounting, management, real estate, stenography and typing.  The numbers and 
enrollments of these institutions were greatly reduced when public high schools expanded and 
increased their offerings in the business and vocational areas.  But many survived and morphed 
into some of the current for-profits, such as Blair College (established 1897; now part of Everest 
College), Bryant and Stratton College (1854), Gibbs College (1911), Globe University (1885), 
Rasmussen College (1900), and Strayer University (1892).   
Distance learning, known today as on-line education, also has an interesting past in 
“correspondence courses” that were offered by many universities beginning in the late nineteenth 
century including some of the most prestigious, such as the University of Chicago and the 
University of Wisconsin (Watkins, 1991).  On-line education is today’s most rapidly growing 
part of higher education.  Walden University, founded in 1970 and today one the largest for-
profit on-line institutions, pioneered on-line studies to allow working professionals to earn 
further degrees. 
In this article, we describe the schools, students, and programs in the for-profit higher 
education sector, its phenomenal recent growth, and its relationship to the federal and state 
governments.  As a starting point, for-profit postsecondary enrollments have grown considerably 
during the past several decades, particularly in degree programs and at large national providers 
with substantial on-line offerings.  Fall enrollment in for-profit degree-granting institutions grew 
by more than 100-fold from 18,333 in 1970 to 1.85 million in 2009.  During that same time 
period, total fall enrollment in all degree-granting institutions increased 2.4 fold from 8.58 
million in 1970 to 20.43 million in 2009 (U.S. Department of Education, 2010,  Digest, table 
197).  Thus, for-profit enrollment increased from 0.2 percent to 9.1 percent of total enrollment in 
degree-granting schools from 1970 to 2009.  For-profit institutions for many decades also have 
accounted for the vast majority of enrollments in non-degree granting postsecondary schools 
(those offering shorter certificate programs) both overall and among such schools eligible for 
federal (Title IV) student financial aid. 
Figure 1 highlights the rise of for-profits in the enrollments of Title IV eligible (degree 
and non-degree granting) higher education institutions since 2000, a period when enrollment in 
the for-profit sector tripled while enrollment for the rest of higher education increased by just 22 -2- 
 
percent.  The solid dark line shows that the fraction of fall enrollments accounted for by the for-
profits increased from 4.3 percent in 2000 to 10.7 percent in 2009.
  For the descriptive data 
presented here, we rely extensively on the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) of the U.S. Department of Education, which is an annual survey of all postsecondary 
institutions that participate in the federal student financial aid programs.
1  
Under the solid dark line in Figure 1, there is a breakdown of growth of the for-profit 
sector into “independent” schools, on-line institutions, and for-profit “chains.”  We must first 
define these terms since these categories are not designated in the official IPEDS data.  
“Independent” schools are defined here as those operating in no more than one state and having 
no more than five campus branches.  A “chain” is a for-profit institution that operates in more 
than one state or has more than five campus branches within a single state.  A for-profit is 
designated as on-line if it has the word “on-line” in its name or, more commonly, if no more than 
33 percent of the school’s students are from one U.S. state.  All on-line institutions are 
considered to be chains since they serve students in multiple geographic markets.  Independent 
schools showed little increase in their share of overall enrollments in higher-education from 2000 
to 2009; chains with largely in-person enrollment showed a doubling over this period; and on-
line institutions, typically part of national publicly-traded companies, increased from almost 
nothing to become the largest part of the sector.  Indeed, almost 90 percent of the increase in for-
profit enrollments during the last decade occurred because of the expansion of for-profit chains. 
The rapid growth of the for-profits from 2000 to 2009 is illustrated in various ways in 
Figure 2.  The for-profit share of 12-month (unduplicated headcount) enrollments increased from 
5 percent in 2001 to 13 percent in 2009.  The 12-month enrollment measure better captures 
enrollments in for-profits than the standard fall enrollment measure because it includes students 
in less conventional and short programs that they enter throughout the year.  
For-profits have expanded their enrollment share more rapidly for women than for men 
and they play an increasingly large role in the higher education of older students.  The for-profit 
enrollment share of students 25 years and older expanded from around 6 percent in 2001 to 18 
percent in 2009.  Undergraduate completions from for-profit institutions grew from 13 percent of 
the total in 2000 to almost 18 percent in 2008.  The fraction of completions is considerably larger 
than that for enrollments because more than half of for-profit completions are certificates and 
most certificate programs are no more than one year. 
                                                 
1 An on-line Appendix available with this paper at <http://e-jep.org> provides the details of our 
processing of the micro IPEDS data, linkage of the IPEDS institution-year data to financial aid to data 
from the National Student Loan Data System, and construction of an institution-level panel data set for 
2000 to 2009. 
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 For-profit enrollments and completions in recent years have been growing most rapidly 
in longer degree programs.  In the last decade, the for-profits increased their share of completers 
in all types of undergraduate programs, but more so for AAs and BAs than for certificates.  They 
produced about 39 percent of certificates in 2000 and 42 percent in 2008.  For-profit AAs were 
13 percent of all AAs in 2000 but 18 percent in 2008; BAs were less than 2 percent of all in 2000 
but were 5 percent of all BAs in 2008 (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, Digest, table 195).   
The current incarnation of the for-profit sector is big business; its largest providers are 
major profitable publicly-traded corporations (Bennett, Lucchesi, and Vedder, 2010).  They 
appear to be nimble critters that train non-traditional learners for jobs in fast growing areas, such 
as health care and information technology.  On the other side, most of them depend on U.S. 
government student aid for the vast bulk of their revenues.  Default rates on the loans taken out 
by their students vastly exceed those of other institutions of higher education and audit studies 
have shown that some for-profits have engaged in highly aggressive and even borderline 
fraudulent recruiting techniques (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010).   
Are the for-profits nimble critters or agile predators?  Using the 2004 to 2009 Beginning 
Postsecondary Students (BPS) longitudinal survey we assess outcomes of a recent cohort of first-
time undergraduates who attended for-profits relative to comparable students who attended 
community colleges or other public or private non-profit institutions.  We find that relative to 
community colleges and other public and private non-profits, for-profits educate a larger fraction 
of minority, disadvantaged, and older students, and they have greater success at retaining 
students in their first year and getting them to complete shorter degree and non-degree programs 
at the certificate and AA levels.  But we also find that for-profits leave students with far larger 
student loan debt burdens.  For-profit students end up with higher unemployment and “idleness” 
rates and lower earnings from employment six years after entering programs than do comparable 
students from other schools.  Not surprisingly, for-profit students have trouble paying off their 
student loans and have far greater default rates.  And for-profit students self-report lower 
satisfaction with their courses of study and are less likely to consider their education and loans 
worth the price-tag relative to similarly-situated students who went to public and private non-
profit institutions.    
 
What is the For-Profit Postsecondary School Sector? 
 
Apollo and the Lesser For-Profit Deities: A Diverse Sector 
The for-profit postsecondary school sector, at its simplest level, is a group of institutions 
that give post-high school degrees or credentials and for which some of the legal “non-
distribution requirements” that potentially constrain private non-profit schools do not bind.  For -4- 
 
example, for-profit institutions can enter the equity market and have few constraints on the 
amounts they can legally pay their top managers.  In practice, only the largest players in this 
market raise substantial capital in organized equity markets and tend to pay their top executives 
mega-salaries that exceed those of presidents at the public and non-profit private universities. 
Among the for-profits, Andrew Clark, chief executive officer of Bridgepoint Education, Inc., 
received more than $20 million in 2009, while Charles Edelstein, co-chief executive officer of 
the Apollo Group, Inc., earned more than $11 million.
2   
For-profit sector institutions are a varied group.  For-profit schools offer doctorates but 
also non-degree courses, and their programs run the gamut from healthcare, business, and 
computers to cosmetology, massage, and dog grooming.  The sector contains the largest schools 
by enrollment in the United States and also some of the smallest.  For example, the University of 
Phoenix Online campus enrolled over 532,000 students and Kaplan University enrolled 96,000 
during the 2008-09 academic year.  Taken together the largest 15 institutions account for almost 
60 percent of for-profit enrollments (Bennett, Lucchesi, and Vedder 2010, table 1).  But 
tabulations from the IPEDS also indicate that the median Title IV eligible for-profit institution 
had a Fall 2008 enrollment of 172 students as compared with 3,713 for the median community 
college (two-year public institution), 7,145 for the median four-year public university, and 1,149 
for the median four-year private not-for-profit school. 
 The for-profit sector has become in many people’s minds synonymous with the large for-
profit chains that have rapidly expanded their presence in the BA and graduate education 
markets, especially the Apollo Group, which owns the University of Phoenix.  But even though 
the big players in this sector do account the majority of for-profit enrollments, another important 
part of the sector consists of career colleges that focus on a wide range of shorter AA and 
certificate programs.  Completions in the for-profit sector are still dominated by certificate 
programs and 55 percent of the certificates granted by the for-profits are awarded by the 1,700 or 
so independent career colleges and institutes.  Our tabulations from the IPEDS indicate that 
certificates account for 54 percent of the degrees and awards conferred by for-profits in 2008-9. 
  There are several important commonalities across this mixed group.  The for-profit 
sector offers almost no general education and liberal arts programs.  For-profit programs 
                                                 
2 Non-profits and publics are not that far behind in pay just below the very top of the for-profit scale.  
In 2006/07, before the stock market decline, the highest paid university president was Gordon Gee at 
Vanderbilt who earned slightly more than $2 million in total compensation.   A bit lower down the scale, 
the tenth highest paid CEO at a for-profit was Wallace Boston, Jr. CEO of American Public Education 
with $961K, while number 10 among the presidents of public institutions on the list was Jack Varsalona 
at Wilmington University who earned $974K.  After the stock market drop, earnings in 2008/09 for 
presidents at public and non-profit private universities were far lower.  The data on for-profit CEO pay is 
from “CEO Compensation at Publicly Traded Higher-Education Companies” (2010); data on public and 
non-profit president’s pay is from Gibson (2009).  -5- 
 
typically are not meant to prepare students to continue to another form of higher education, as is 
the case with most community colleges.  Rather, the for-profits almost always offer training for a 
vocation or trade.  In that sense, they are “career colleges.” In addition, virtually all the for-
profits require that admitted students have a high school diploma or another secondary school 
credential such as a GED.  Their ability to obtain federal (Title IV) financial aid for their students 
is typically contingent on their admitting primarily students who have already completed 
secondary school.  However, beyond requiring a high school degree, for-profit institutions are 
almost always non-selective and open admissions. 
For-profit higher education is more likely to flourish in providing vocational programs 
that lead to certification and early job placement and have clear short-run outcomes that can 
serve to build institutional reputation in the labor market.  But the for-profits are likely to be in a 
far less advantageous position where external benefits (and subsidies from donors and 
government) are important and the qualities of inputs and outputs are difficult to verify 
(Winston, 1999).  For-profits also have been successful at designing programs to attract non-
traditional students who may not be well served by public institutions (Breneman, Pusser, and 
Turner 2006).  
 
What is Title IV Eligibility? 
The for-profit sector that we analyze here includes almost exclusively those that are 
termed “Title IV eligible.”  Because for-profits often cater to independent students and those 
from low-income families who finance college through Pell grants and federal student loans, 
they have an intricate relationship with the federal government to ensure they maintain eligibility 
to receive Title IV federal student aid.  The for-profits, like public institutions of higher 
education, receive an extremely large fraction of their revenues from government sources. 
Title IV eligibility is granted by the U.S. Department of Education and requires that the 
institution be accredited by at least one of their approved accrediting agencies, be registered by 
one of the states, and meet other standards on a continued basis.  Some of these standards 
concern the length of programs and some concern students and their federal loan repayment 
activity.  A Title IV-eligible private for-profit school must either provide training for gainful 
employment in a recognized occupation or provide a program leading to a baccalaureate degree 
in the liberal arts (U.S. Department of Education 2011a).  Our discussion excludes non-Title IV 
for-profit schools, about which little has been known because the U.S. Department of Education 
does not track them.  Virtually all degrees are granted by Title IV eligible institutions, but 
programs that are less than two years in length that grant certificates (also diplomas) often are 
found at non-Title IV institutions.  For an analysis of the importance of the non-Title IV group of 
for-profit schools using state registration data, see Cellini and Goldin (2011). Because virtually 
all degree granting institutions are Title IV eligible, the undercount from limiting the analysis to -6- 
 
Title IV schools impacts only the non-degree (typically certificate) programs in institutions 
without any degree program. 
 
For-Profit Programs 
The for-profits loom large in the production of degrees and certificates in certain 
programs.  For-profits produce 18 percent of all associate’s degrees, but they produce 33 percent 
of the AAs granted in business, management and marketing, 51 percent in computer and 
information sciences, 23 percent in the health professions and 34 percent in security and 
protective services.  In the public and non-profit private sectors an AA degree is often the 
gateway to a four-year college and, in consequence, 38 percent of these AA programs are in 
general studies and liberal arts programs.  In the for-profits, a mere 2.4 percent are in general 
studies and liberal arts.  
  Although 5 percent of all BAs are granted by for-profit institutions, 12 percent of all BAs 
in business, management, and marketing are.  Other large for-profit BA programs are in 
communications (52 percent of all BAs in communications are granted by for-profits), computer 
and information sciences (27 percent), and personal and culinary services (42 percent). 
  Certain programs are highly concentrated in the for-profit degree categories. Among AA 
degrees just two program groups—business, management and marketing and the health 
professions— account for 52 percent of all degrees.  In the BA group, the business program 
produces almost 50 percent of the total.  Among certificates granted in the Title IV for-profit 
sector, health professions and personal and culinary services account for 78 percent of certificate 
completers (U.S. Department of Education, NCES, 2009, tables 37 and 40; authors’ tabulations 
from the IPEDS).  
 
Who Are the Students? 
The for-profit sector disproportionately serves older students, women, African-
Americans, Hispanics, and those with low incomes. Table 1 looks at the characteristics of 
students in various types of institutions of higher education.  African Americans account for 13 
percent of all students in higher education, but they are 22 percent of those in the for-profit 
sector.  Hispanics are 15 percent of those in the for-profit sector, yet 11.5 percent of all students.  
Women are 65 percent of those in the for-profit sector.  For profit students are older, about 65 
percent are 25 years and older, whereas just 31 percent of those at four-year public colleges are 
and 40 percent of those at two-year colleges are.  
Using the BPS longitudinal survey data for students entering postsecondary school during 
the 2003-04 academic year, we can get a more detailed picture of for-profit students relative to -7- 
 
those at other colleges.  Because the BPS surveys only first-time undergraduates, the results are 
somewhat different from the IPEDS, which surveys institutions about all students.  But the 
storyline remains the same.   
Compared with those in community colleges (almost entirely two-year public schools), 
for-profit students are disproportionately single parents, have much lower family incomes, and 
are almost twice as likely to have a General Equivalency Degree (GED).  Among for-profit 
students in the BPS data, 55 percent are in certificate programs and just 11 percent are enrolled 
in a BA program.  Similarly, among all for-profit students in the IPEDS, certificates are 54 
percent of all completions or degrees conferred and associates are 22.5 percent (U.S. Department 
of Education, 2010, Digest, table 195).  The BA group is just 13 percent but is the fastest 
growing degree group among the for-profits.  Post-graduate programs, primarily master’s 
degrees, account for the remaining 10.5 percent.
3   
 
The Business Model of the For-Profit Sector 
 
For-profit chains led by on-line institutions experienced phenomenal growth in the past 
several decades.  The growth has been largely due to an extension of a business model that has 
emphasized the special client base of the for-profits combined with the ability to “clone” 
successful programs using web technology and the standardization of curriculum for traditional 
in-person courses.  In this section, we turn to the financial and business aspects of the for-profits. 
For more detail on the business strategies of for-profit colleges, the interested reader might start 
with Breneman, Pusser and Turner (2006) and Hentschke (2010). 
The expansion of the chains (including on-line institutions) accounts for 87 percent of the 
increase in fall enrollment during the past decade.  The increase in on-line enrollment alone 
accounts for 54 percent of the total.  The rise of the chains is responsible, as well, for 80 percent 
of the increase in federal loan and grant volumes of the for-profits. For-profit chains and on-line 
programs also benefit from economies of scale in advertising and recruitment costs. 
 
                                                 
3 We should note that the comparison between enrollments in the BPS and completions in the IPEDS 
is generally not valid when programs vary in length.  But because the BPS surveys a cohort, the 
comparison has greater validity. -8- 
 
Client Base and Recruiting 
The Title IV eligible for-profit sector receives the majority of its revenues from federal 
financial aid programs in the form of loans and grants to their students.  For-profits appeal to 
older individuals who are simultaneously employed and in school or taking care of family 
members.  Some of the for-profits offer services, such as child care, to deter enrollees from 
dropping out, especially during the period when the student can get a refund and to minimize the 
institution’s dropout rate to maintain accreditation (for example, Rosenbaum, Deil-Amien and 
Person, 2006).  The for-profits are attractive to non-traditional students, many of whom are low 
income, require financial aid and need help filling out aid forms.  For-profits often give generous 
transfer credit to students who began their BAs at other institutions. 
For-profit institutions devote substantial resources to sales and marketing.  Advertising in 
2009, as demonstrated in one study of 13 large national chains, was around 11 percent of 
revenue.  Sales and marketing (including advertising) for this group was around 24 percent of 
revenue.  In consequence, the average new student recruit costs one of the large national chains 
about $4,000 (Steinerman, Volshteyn and McGarrett, 2011).
4  Annual tuition at for-profit 
institutions was about $16,000 for a BA program, $15,000 for an AA program, and $13,000 for a 
certificate program in 2010-11, as compared to average undergraduate tuition of about $7,000 at 
public four-year institutions for in-state students and $16,000 for out-of-state students and 
$22,000 for private non-profit schools (Knapp, Kelley-Reid, and Ginder, 2011, Table 3). 
 
Responsiveness to Markets 
For-profits cater to the expanding market of non-traditional students, develop curriculum 
and teaching practices to be able to provide identical program at multiple locations and at 
convenient times, and offer highly-structured programs to make timely completion feasible 
(Hentschke, 2010).  For profits are attuned to the marketplace and are quick to open new schools, 
hire faculty, and add programs in growing fields and localities. For example, Turner (2006) finds 
that change in for-profit college enrollments are more positively correlated with changes in state 
college-age populations than are changes in public-sector college enrollments. 
For-profits are less encumbered than public and non-profit schools by physical plant, 
alumni, and tenured faculty.  Take the expanding health profession fields, for example. 
Enrollment in programs involving the health professions doubled from 2000 to 2009.  In the for-
profit sector it tripled, whereas in all other postsecondary institutions it increased by 1.4 times.  
                                                 
4 The large national chains in the study are American Public Education, Apollo Group, Bridgepoint 
Education, Capella Education, Career Education, Corinthian Colleges, DeVry Inc., Education 
Management, Grand Canyon Education, ITT Educational Services, Lincoln Education, Strayer Education, 
and Universal Technical Institute. -9- 
 
In consequence, the fraction of enrollment in the allied health fields in the for-profits increased 
from 35 percent to 52 percent, as illustrated in Figure 3.  The increase in such enrollments at the 
national and regional chains accounts for almost the entire 17 percentage point increase. 
Looking more closely at these programs, the for-profits have rapidly entered the growing 
fields of medical assisting, phlebotomy, x-ray and ultrasound technicians, practical nursing, and 
even registered nursing.  The total number of AA degrees in the health professions doubled 
during the past decade but degrees in this area from for-profits quadrupled, with degrees from the 
large for-profit chains rising by a multiple of six.  A similar pattern arises for certificates in the 
health professions, where for-profit national and regional chains more than tripled their awards 
from 2000 to 2009 at a time when the public sector only more than doubled theirs. 
 
On-line Education 
On-line education fits many of the features of the for-profit business model. For example, 
it attracts older students who need to combine work with schooling and appeals to students who 
do not want to learn on the academic calendar. (There is even a popular advertisement: “Earn 
your college degree in your pajamas.”)  Much of the growth of for-profits during the last decade 
has been in schools emphasizing on-line programs, as seen in Figure 1.   
Some of this increase was due to U.S. Department of Education regulatory changes.  
Prior to 1998, a Title IV-eligible institution could not have more than half of its enrollment in 
distance education.  Then in 1998, the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorized the U.S. 
Department of Education to grant waivers to promote new advances in distance education.  By 
the early 2000s many of the larger chains were granted waivers, and the limit on share of 
enrollment in distance education was dropped.  The regulatory change in 2005 spurred the 
growth of dedicated on-line institutions.  By 2007-08, 12 percent of undergraduates and 25 
percent of graduate students at for-profits took their entire program through distance education as 
compared with less than 3 percent for undergraduates and 8 percent for graduate students at 
public and private non-profit institutions combined (U.S. Department of Education, NCES, 2011, 
tables A-43-1 and A-43-2). 
 
Federal Student Financial Aid 
Federal student financial aid is the lifeblood of for-profit higher education.  Federal 
grants and loans received under Title IV of the HEA accounted for 73.7 percent of the revenues 
of Title IV-eligible private for-profit higher education institutions in 2008-09 (based on data in 
U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, 2011).  Under current 
regulations, for-profit schools can derive no more than 90 percent of their revenue from Title IV -10- 
 
financial aid sources to maintain Title IV eligibility, and the constraint comes close to binding 
for many for-profits.  In fact, 30 percent of for-profit institutions, including many of the largest 
national chains such as the University of Phoenix and Kaplan University, received more than 80 
percent of their revenues from federal Title IV student aid in 2008-09.  These Title IV revenue 
figures actually understate the importance of federal student aid to for-profit institutions since 
they do not include military educational benefits provided to veterans and active service 
members, which do not count towards the limit 90 percent federal Title IV student aid revenues.  
The for-profits have, in consequence, actively recruited military benefit recipients—veterans, 
service members, and their family members—especially under the Post-9/11 GI Bill of 2008.  
For-profits accounted for 36.5 percent of the benefits paid under the Post-9/11 GI Bill during the 
first year of the program (Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 2010, p. 4). 
For-profit institutions receive a disproportionate share of federal Title IV student 
financial aid both because they have higher tuition and fees than public institutions and because 
they attract large numbers of students who are financially independent or come from low-income 
families.  For-profits accounted for 24 percent of Pell grant disbursements and 26 percent of 
federal student loan disbursements in 2008-09 even though they enrolled 12 percent of the 
students (authors’ tabulations from the IPEDS and NSLDS).  Half of undergraduates at for-profit 
schools received Pell grants, as compared with 25 percent at public and private non-profit 
institutions combined. 
The sharp increase in the enrollments at for-profit schools has been accompanied by a 
rapid rise in their share of federal student financial aid from 2000 to 2010, as shown in Figure 4.  
The for-profit share of Pell grants increased over the last decade from 13 to 25 percent and their 
share of total federal student loans (both subsidized and unsubsidized loans) increased from 11 
percent in 2000 to 26 percent in 2009 before dipping to 23 percent in 2010.
5 
Of course, public-sector institutions receive direct taxpayer support largely from state 
government appropriations, enabling tuition and fees to be lower than they otherwise would be.  
If federal student loans to students at for-profits are repaid, taxpayer costs are actually lower to 
finance education in for-profits than in public-sector institutions. But the comparison is not quite 
apples-to-apples. The rationale for subsidies to public institutions and private non-profit schools 
is that they produce research with potentially large spillover benefits and that they educate 
students in the liberal arts and other fields that may improve civil society and generate external 
benefits.  Also, loans to students attending for-profits often do not get repaid. 
 
                                                 
5 The slight decline in the for-profit share of loans in 2010 may reflect the shift from the Federal 
Family Education Loan program with bank lending under federal guarantees to the Direct Loan program 
where the federal government makes the loans directly to students. -11- 
 
Default Rates 
Students from for-profit institutions have higher default rates on federal student loans 
than students in other sectors.  And the default rates of for-profits have risen substantially during 
the last five years.
6 
The two-year “cohort default rate” measures the percentage of borrowers who enter 
repayment of federal student loans (by leaving a program through graduation or dropping out) 
during a fiscal year and default prior to the end of the next fiscal year.  An institution loses Title 
IV eligibility if its two-year cohort default rate exceeds 25 percent for three consecutive years or 
is 40 percent in any one year.  The two-year cohort default rate of for-profit institutions was 11.6 
percent for fiscal year 2008 as compared with 6 percent for public institutions and 4 percent for 
private non-profits.  The U.S. Department of Education is moving to a three-year cohort default 
rate standard for maintaining Title IV eligibility in fiscal year 2012.  Three-year cohort default 
rates for fiscal year 2008 were 24.9 percent for for-profits, 7.6 percent for private non-profits, 
and 10.8 percent for public institutions (Steinerman, Volshteyn, and McGarrett, 2011).  The 
sharp increase in default rates from a two- to a three-year window may, to some extent, reflect 
incentives for institutions to minimize defaults within the current two-year regulatory window.  
Thus, three-year default rates also are likely to provide a more realistic indicator of long-run loan 
repayment rates than the two-year default rates.
7 
We examine the role of student demographics, financial aid take-up, and institutional 
characteristics (degree types, distance education and remedial course offerings, and student 
services) in explaining the higher federal student loan default rates of for-profit institutions.  
Figure 5 graphs (regression-adjusted) differences in three-year cohort default rates by type of 
institution.  The differences are computed from regressions of default rates on institution type 
(with public four-year institutions as the base group) including year dummies plus successive 
additions of controls for student and institution characteristics, geography, and school selectivity 
for pooled institution-year data covering the 2005 to 2008 fiscal years.  
The raw default rates and those regression-adjusted for institutional and student 
characteristics are highest for the for-profit schools followed by community colleges and then 
four-year public and non-profit institutions.  The unadjusted 11 percentage point higher three-
                                                 
6 Current default rates at for-profits, however, remain lower than in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
before the 1992 amendments to the HEA that tightened institutional eligibility for Title IV funds and 
removed many non-degree proprietary schools with very high default rates from the Title IV financial aid 
programs (Bennett, Lucchesi, and Vedder 2010). 
7 Furthermore, since federal Stafford loans have an initial 6 month grace period and can be up to 360 
days delinquent before being considered in default, the two-year default rates typically cover a much 
shorter window in which a recorded default is possible. 
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year cohort default rates for for-profits (col. 1) relative to the base group of four-year public 
institutions is reduced slightly to 10.5 percentage points with the addition of detailed controls for 
student demographics, institutional characteristics, and city fixed effects (cols. 2 and 3) despite 
the fact that these controls explain a substantial fraction of the cross-institution variation in 
default rates.  The addition of the covariates modestly expands the for-profit default rate gap 
relative to community colleges.   
The for-profit default rate is 8.7 percentage points higher than that for four-year publics 
and non-profits and 5.7 percentage points higher than for community colleges even when the 
sample is limited to non-selective (open admission) institutions (col. 4).  Higher three-year 
cohort default rates are apparent for all segments of the for-profit sector, including independent 
schools, regional chains, national chains, and largely on-line institutions (see Appendix Table 1, 
available on-line with this paper at http://e-jep.org).  National chains have higher default rates 
and on-line institutions lower default rates relative to all for-profits.   
For-profit institutions account for a large and rising share of federal financial aid. For-
profit students have much higher default rates and account for 47 percent of defaults today.  
Default rates have been rising in recent years particularly for the for-profit chains and beyond 
what can be accounted for by basic student characteristics.  
 
Student Outcomes 
 
The large increase in federal student aid dollars flowing to for-profits has attracted 
substantial scrutiny about the quality of their programs and whether they provide students with 
sufficient skills to enable them to thrive in the labor market and be able to pay off their student 
debts (for example, Baum 2011).  Simple comparisons of student outcomes between the for-
profits and other institutions may be misleading: after all, the for-profits disproportionately 
attract minority, older, independent, and disadvantaged students.  Thus, we assess student 
outcomes of the for-profits relative to other higher education institutions after adjusting for 
observable differences in students who have attended different types of schools. 
The recent and rapid growth of for-profit colleges means that most of the standard 
individual-level longitudinal data sets do not identify those who went to for-profit institutions or 
do not have large enough samples of for-profit students for a meaningful analysis. To overcome 
these constraints we use the most recent cohort of the Beginning Postsecondary Students 
Longitudinal Study, known as BPS:04/09.  This sample follows a sample of 2003-04 first-time 
beginning postsecondary students in their first, third, and sixth years since entering an 
undergraduate institution through 2009.  Because it covers a recent cohort, a significant fraction 
of the sample initially enrolled in a for-profit institution.  The BPS has detailed student -13- 
 
background variables, low attrition rates, and an oversample of students at for-profit institutions 
yielding approximately 1,950 students starting at for-profits out of a total of about 16,680 
students in our main sample.
8   
The BPS is representative of first-time postsecondary students (those starting an 
undergraduate program with no previous postsecondary schooling).  But because a large fraction 
of students in for-profit institutions are older, nontraditional students returning to higher-
education, they will not be picked up in this sample.  Thus, our analysis estimates the for-profit 
school treatment effect (relative to other types of institutions) for first-time postsecondary 
students but not for the large group of returning students. 
The outcome variables in the BPS are divided into two major groups.  Those concerning 
college costs and financial aid are given in Table 2 and those regarding student persistence, 
educational attainment, employment, earnings, and satisfaction with the program are in Table 3.  
The raw data, given in cols. (1) to (3) of Tables 2 and 3, reveal that beginning postsecondary 
students at for-profits accumulate larger student debt burdens, are more likely to default on their 
student loans, have poorer employment outcomes five years after entering postsecondary school, 
and are less likely to be satisfied with their course of study than students starting at public or 
private non-profit schools.  The short-run (one-year) dropout rate is slightly lower for starting 
for-profit students than those starting in a community college.  For-profit students in certificate 
and AA programs have higher completion rates than community college students.  In contrast, 
BA completion rates of for-profit students are much lower than of those starting in four-year 
public and non-profit schools.  
Using the BPS, we assess whether the raw mean student outcome differences have been 
overstated because for-profit students differ from those in the public and the private non-profit 
sectors, as demonstrated in the bottom panel of Table 1.  To do this, we adjust the raw outcomes 
for differences in baseline observables between for-profit students and others using two methods. 
The first method is a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of student 
outcomes on a rich set of covariates of student baseline characteristics at entry into college 
(listed in the table notes), and a dummy variable for starting postsecondary schooling in a for-
profit institution.  The alternative method is a matching approach, which takes students starting 
in for-profits as the treatment group and students starting in public and private non-profit schools 
                                                 
8 We use the sampling weights from the BPS in all our analyses to account for the variation in 
sampling rates among different student subgroups.  The attrition rates from the BPS:04/09 by the final 
2009 survey round are relatively balanced by starting institution at 6.4 percent for students from for-
profits, 10.9 percent for community college students, and 10.7 percent for students from four-year public 
and non-profit schools. The differences in attrition rate by starting institution type are small and not 
statistically significant after conditioning on baseline covariates.  Unweighted sample sizes are rounded to 
the nearest 10. -14- 
 
as the control group.  We compare the outcomes of the for-profit students to the control group 
members who are observably comparable to for-profit students.  More specifically, we estimate 
the average treatment on treated effect of starting in a for-profit institution using nearest neighbor 
(propensity score) matching models with replacement excluding observations outside of common 
support.
9  For educational attainment outcomes, the estimation samples are separated into the 
sub-groups of students initially enrolled in each type of program (certificate, AA, BA). 
The OLS results are shown in col. (4) for the full sample and those for the matching 
estimator are in col. (5) of Tables 2 and 3.  The OLS and matching approaches produce 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar estimates for almost every outcome considered 
Our conclusions with regard to the relative performance of students starting in for-profit 
institutions are mixed.  For-profit students have a higher probability of staying with a program 
through its first year.  Early persistence translates into a higher probability of obtaining a degree 
or certificate in a one- or two-year program.  The OLS estimates indicate that certificate seekers 
starting at for-profits are almost 9 percentage points more likely to gain a certificate than 
community college students.  Although for-profit students seeking an AA are somewhat more 
likely than community college students to attain an AA degree, they are less likely to continue to 
higher-level college courses and to gain a BA degree.  The matching estimates indicate that the 
for-profit advantage in completing certificate and AA programs is more modest and less 
statistically significant than the OLS estimates.  
 Students in for-profit institutions are also much less likely to report taking remedial 
courses in their first year in postsecondary school than students in other institutions.  The greater 
ability of for-profit students to take courses they consider directly relevant and not languish in 
remedial courses may play a role in their greater first-year retention rates.
10  
For the longer undergraduate programs, such as BA, for-profits do not fare as well as 
four-year public and private non-profit institutions.  The OLS estimate implies a 12 percentage 
point completion deficit and the matching model implies a 19 percentage point deficit for 
students starting BA programs at for-profits.  The control group of students in the full range of 
public and private non-profit four-year schools is probably less comparable in the case of BA 
students than for certificate and AA programs.  But even when the sample is restricted to 
students starting in non-selective schools, a statistically significant deficit of almost 5 percentage 
                                                 
9 We implement the nearest-neighbor matching estimator in STATA using the routines developed by 
Becker and Ichino (2002).  
10 See Rosenbaum, Deil-Amien and Person (2006) for rich case study evidence of the roles of clearer 
program paths, more relevant courses, and student services in better retention and short program 
completion rates for students in for-profit schools relative to community colleges. Rutschow and 
Schneider (2011) summarize recent evidence from interventions designed to improve students’ progress 
through remedial courses at community colleges. -15- 
 
points remains (details in Appendix Table 2, available online with this paper at <http://e-
jep.org>).
11 
Also, for-profits leave students with considerably higher debt, even conditional on a rich 
set of observables.  For-profit students face higher sticker-price tuition and pay higher net tuition 
(tuition plus fees minus grants) than comparable students at other institutions.  Students who 
began at a for-profit school default on their loans at higher rates than other students conditional 
on controls for demographics, academic preparation, and pre-enrollment family resources.  For-
profit students have substantially higher default rates even when comparing students across 
school types with similar cumulative debt burdens. For example, the default rate by 2009 for the 
BPS:04/09 students with $5,001 to $10,000 in cumulative federal student loans is 26 percent for 
students from for-profits versus 10 percent for those from community colleges and 7 percent for 
those from 4-year public and nonprofit schools, and for those with $10,001 to $20,000 in debt 
the default rate among for-profit students is 16 percent versus a 3 percent rate for community 
college students and 2 percent rate for other 4-year college students.   
Although the vast majority of students from for-profits express satisfaction with their 
course of study and programs, they report significantly lower satisfaction than observably similar 
students starting in public and non-profit schools.  Students who began in for-profit colleges are 
also less likely to state that their education was worth the amount they paid and are less apt to 
think their student loans were a worthwhile investment.  Even though the for-profits have higher 
short-run retention of students, their students are more likely to leave their certificate or degree 
programs before completion because of dissatisfaction with the program.   
In terms of economic outcomes in the medium-run, for-profit students are more likely to 
be idle (that is, not working and no longer enrolled in school) six years after starting college.  
Among the BPS students who left school by the 2009 survey wave, those from for-profits are 
more likely to be unemployed and to have experienced substantial unemployment (more than 
three months) since leaving school.  For-profit students no longer enrolled in 2009 have earnings 
from work in 2009 that are $1,800 to $2,000 lower (or 8 to 9 percent of their predicted mean 
earnings) than had they gone to another type of institution.
12  Some of the earnings reduction is 
                                                 
11 In addition, Appendix Tables 3 to 5 present comparable analyses for the full range of student 
outcomes for the sub-samples of BPS students starting certificate programs, AA programs, and BA 
programs respectively. 
12 In slight contrast, Cellini and Chaudhary (2011) find similar weekly earnings gains of around 6 
percent to attending a two-year AA program at a private or public two-year college and of 15 to 17 
percent (or 8 percent per year of education) to completing an AA degree at private postsecondary 
institutions (largely for-profit schools) and at public institutions (largely community colleges) using an 
individual fixed effects strategy of comparing earnings before and after college using workers under 30 
years old in the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  Cellini and Chaudhary likely understate 
the relative economic returns to going to a public two-year college relative to a private for-profit 
institution by dropping from their sample the students who continued beyond an AA to get a BA or more. -16- 
 
due to lower rates of employment. Once we condition on employment, for-profit students have 
modestly lower earnings and slightly lower job satisfaction, but neither difference is statistically 
significant. 
For-profit schools, therefore, do better in terms of first-year retention and the completion 
of shorter certificate and degree programs.  But their first-time postsecondary students wind up 
with higher debt burdens, experience greater unemployment after leaving school and, if 
anything, have lower earnings six years after starting college than observationally-similar 
students from public and non-profit institutions.  Not surprisingly, for-profits students end up 
with higher student loan default rates and are less satisfied with their college experiences.   
Lower satisfaction with the programs may provide an additional psychological factor 
accounting for the high default rates of for-profit students, even for those with modest absolute 
student debt levels. In fact, students in this dataset from for-profits with less than $2,500 in 
federal student loan debt had a default rate of 20 percent by 2009 as compared with 12 percent 
for students from community colleges and 4 percent for those from four-year public and non-
profit institutions.  These patterns are troubling since the consequences of federal student loan 
default cannot be escaped through bankruptcy and can adversely impact an individual’s credit 
rating and future access to credit let alone result in wage garnishment, harassment by private 
collection agencies, and tax refund offsets.     
  Although we have used the detailed background covariates in the BPS to make 
comparisons between individuals who are as similar as can be observed, we do not have quasi-
experimental variation concerning who goes to which type of higher-education institution.  Thus, 
one needs to be cautious in providing a causal interpretation of the estimated for-profit school 
treatment effects in Tables 2 and 3 since the potential problem of selection bias from non-
random sorting on unobservables remains.  Furthermore, our comparison of the medium-term 
outcomes for beginning postsecondary students starting at for-profits versus comparable students 
starting at other higher-education institutions does not directly provide information on whether 
attendance at a for-profit college (or, for that matter, attendance at public or private, non-profit 
colleges) is a worthwhile (private or social) investment.   
 
 
Nimble Critters or Agile Predators? 
 
The U.S. economy has experienced a substantial increase in the pecuniary returns to 
postsecondary education since 1980, particularly for BA and higher degrees (Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney, 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2008).  At the same time, state budgetary difficulties have 
constrained the expansion of public-sector higher education; for example, Cellini (2009) 
provides compelling evidence from California on how public-sector funding constraints on -17- 
 
community colleges increased the rate of entry of for-profit colleges. In the meantime, federal 
and state financial aid for students going to for-profit institutions has become more available and 
generous (for example, Cellini 2010). Based on these factors, and others discussed in this paper, 
the for-profit postsecondary school sector became the fastest growing part of U.S. higher 
education from the 1990s through 2010.  Increased regulatory scrutiny and adverse publicity 
from Congressional hearings, investigative reporting, and GAO audits have led to a substantial 
slowdown in the growth of for-profit enrollments in 2011 and actual declines in new students at 
many of the larger national chains (Steinerman, Volshteyn, and McGarrett 2011; Fain 2011). 
Evaluating the successes and failures of U.S. for-profit higher education must go beyond 
mean outcomes and consider the distribution of labor market effects and financial default rates. 
For many, the for-profits have been a success.  They have played a critical role in expanding the 
supply of skilled workers in an era of tight state budgets and stagnating state appropriations to 
public sector schools.  They have provided educational services to underserved populations.  
Their innovative use of web services has further allowed them to accommodate nontraditional 
students.  Their disproportionate share of federal student grants and loans has enabled them to 
provide skills to disadvantaged populations.  Short-run retention is high and the for-profits do an 
admirable job of graduating students from shorter certificate programs.  The vast majority of 
their students are satisfied with their programs.   
  But the for-profits also charge higher tuition and fees than public-sector alternatives, and 
their students are more likely to end up unemployed and with substantial debts.  Students who 
attended a for-profit have much higher default and non-repayment rates on federal student loans 
than do observationally similar students who attended a public or private non-profit institution. 
The U.S. Department of Education (2011b) has recently sought to address this issue of 
the high default rate on loans to students at for-profit institutions by passing “Gainful 
Employment”  regulations, which will require most for-profit programs and certificate programs 
at public and non-profit institutions to pass at least one of three metrics to remain Title IV 
eligible: (1) at least 35 percent of former students repaying their loans (reducing their loan by at 
least $1 over the course of a year); (2) annual loan payments not exceeding 30 percent of a 
typical graduate’s discretionary income; or (3) annual loan payments not exceeding 12 percent of 
a typical graduate’s earnings.  
How these rules will work in practice, as students and for-profit institutions adjust to their 
presence, remains to be seen.  The former students of for-profit institutions have comparable (but 
slightly lower) earnings combined with substantially higher loan burdens, relative to other school 
leavers, suggesting that some for-profit institutions may face challenges meeting the new Gainful 
Employment standards.  As one example, consider the rule that the debt burden (annual federal 
student loan yearly payments) should not exceed 12 percent of annual earnings for a typical 
graduate.  In fact, we find (conditional on observables) in Table 3 for the BPS that for-profit 
students would have had a 15 to 19 percentage point lower rate of meeting the recently enacted -18- 
 
Gainful Employment earnings threshold in 2008 (four to five years after starting) than would 
students from other types of institutions. 
In effect, the Gainful Employment rule seeks to hold the for-profits more accountable and 
put a greater burden on the schools, rather than only on the students who have difficulties in 
repaying their loans.  The new regulations will also require institutions to disclose their program 
costs, as well as completion, placement, and loan repayment rates.  These regulations will 
increase transparency but may be insufficient to contain an agile predator.  A reality check by a 
third party might be needed before a student is allowed to take out a loan.  
The for-profits have taken a large burden of increased enrollment in higher education off 
the public sector.  The high default rates of their students on federal loans, however, increase 
their cost to the taxpayer.  Regulating for-profit colleges is tricky business.  The challenge is to 
rein in the agile predators while not stifling the innovation of these nimble critters. 
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Figure 1: For-Profit Institution Share of Total Title IV Fall Enrollment:  Total and by School 
Type, 2000 to 2009  
 
 
Source: IPEDS. 
Notes: A for-profit institution is classified as “on-line” if it has the word on-line in its name or if 
not more than 33 percent of the school’s students are from one U.S. state.  The “chain (not-on-
line)” category covers all other for-profit institutions that operate in more than one state or have 
more than five campus branches within a single state.  The “independent” category includes for-
profits that operate in only one state and have fewer than five campus branches.  An on-line 
Appendix available with this paper at <http://e-jep.org> provides the details of our processing of 
the micro IPEDS institution-level data for 2000 to 2009. 
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Figure 2: For-Profit Share of Enrollments and Undergraduate Completions: 2000 to 2009 
 
 
Source: IPEDS 
Notes: “All for-profit” is fall enrollment, that is enrollment at the beginning of the academic 
year; “12 month enrollment” = unduplicated enrollment during the entire year; “25 years and 
older” = fall enrollment of those 25 years and older; “women” = female fall enrollment; 
“undergraduate completions” = all undergraduate completions (certificates + associate’s degrees 
+ bachelor’s degrees).  The series for “25 years and older” is for the odd-numbered years and the 
even-numbered years are interpolated from those. 
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Figure 3: Enrollment in Allied Health Fields by Institutional Status and Control 
 
 
 
 
Source: IPEDS. 
Notes: “4 year (public and non-profit colleges)” = public and private non-profit four-year 
institutions; “2 year (public and non-profit colleges)” = two year public (community colleges) 
and two-year private non-profit colleges; “independents” = for-profit independent (non-chain) 
institutions; “chain” = for-profits institutions with “on-line” in the school name or that operate in 
more than one state or that have more than five campus branches in a single state.  
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Figure 4: For-Profit Share of Federal Financial Aid (Pell Grants and Student Loans): 2000 to 
2010 
 
 
 
Source: National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS). 
Notes: Student loans include subsidized and unsubsidized federal student loans under the Federal 
Family Education Loan (FFEL) and Direct Loan Programs 
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Figure 5: Differences in Three-Year Cohort Default Rate by Type of Institution: 2005 to 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic  controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Financial aid controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Degree types, offerings  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Limited to open admission  No  No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.295 0.428 0.642 0.553 
Sample size  14,655  14,655  14,655  9,281 
 
Source: National Student Loan Data System and IPEDS. 
Notes: Each bar gives the coefficient on a type of institution from a regression where the 
dependent variable is the three-year cohort default rate for an institution-year observation and the 
omitted group is four-year public institutions.  The sample covers institution-year observations 
for the fiscal years 2005 to 2008.  Demographic controls are fractions part-time, 25 years and 
older, female, African American, and Hispanic.  Financial aid controls are the number of 
recipients of Pell grants and subsidized and unsubsidized federal loans, total yearly disbursement -27- 
 
amounts for each, and total loans and Pell grants per enrollee.  Degree types and offerings are 
indicators for distance education, remedial course offerings, whether the institution offers 
assistance with job placement, whether it offers part-time employment services for enrolled 
students, the highest award or degree offered by the institution, and whether it has open 
admissions.  Standard errors are clustered by institution.  Table 1 in an on-line Appendix, 
available with this paper at http://e-jep.org, provides the full regression, standard errors, and the 
effect of separating the for-profits into the subcategories of independents, regional chains, 
national chains, and on-line institutions. 
  -28- 
 
Table 1: Student Characteristics from the BPS and IPEDS for For-Profits, Two-Year Public 
Colleges, and Four-Year (Non-Profit) Colleges 
  Student Characteristics by IPEDS Institution Type, 2009/10 
 
For-Profit 
Institutions 
Two-Year 
Public 
Colleges 
Four-Year 
Public 
Colleges 
Four-Year  
Private Non-
Profit Colleges 
Female  0.651 0.570 0.552 0.576 
African-American  0.221 0.136 0.109 0.104 
Hispanic  0.150 0.157 0.105 0.093 
Full-time  0.579 0.410 0.733 0.742 
Age 25 years and over  0.651  0.404  0.306  0.392 
Federal loans per student  11,415  759  3,512  5,769 
Pell Grant per student  2,370  773  738  632 
Tuition  (in-state)  13,103 2,510  5,096 24,470 
Number of institutions  2,995  1,595  690  1,589 
  BPS 2004-2009 Sample Characteristics 
 
For-Profit 
Institutions 
Community 
Colleges 
Four-Year Public and 
Non-Profit Colleges 
Female 0.659  0.564  0.558 
African-American 0.248  0.140  0.141 
Hispanic 0.264  0.159  0.103 
Age 24.4  23.8  19.5 
Single parent  0.288  0.124  0.030 
Delayed enrollment after HS  0.576  0.481  0.142 
HS Diploma  0.754  0.852  0.947 
GED 0.172  0.095  0.022 
Mother HS dropout  0.224  0.137  0.055 
2003 Family income if a dependent  36,854  60,039  76,509 
2003 Family income if independent  17,282  31,742  78,664 
Enrolled full-time  0.809  0.460  0.903 
Worked while enrolled, 2003-2004  0.635  0.755  0.499 
Enrolled in a certificate program  0.551  0.072  0.015 
Enrolled in an AA program  0.326  0.774  0.061 
Enrolled in an BA program  0.106  0  0.891 
Expects to earn a BA  0.643  0.799  0.980 
 
Sample size (unweighted)  1,950  5,970  8,760 
 
Sources: BPS:04/09; IPEDS. 
Notes: Community colleges include two-year public and private non-profit institutions. 
Unweighted sample sizes in the BPS are rounded to the nearest 10. The IPEDS tabulations cover 
the (undergraduate and graduate) enrollments of Title IV institutions in Fall 2009. The BPS 
tabulations cover beginning postsecondary students entering a Title IV institution in the 2003-04 
academic year. -29- 
 
Table 2: Differences in College Costs and Financial Aid between For-Profit Institutions and 
Other Schools for First-Time Undergraduates: 2004/2009 Beginning Postsecondary Students 
Longitudinal Study   
  Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS, full sample) 
Dependent Variables  Dependent Variable Means    For-Profit Institution 
Impact 
 (1) 
Four-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(2) 
Two-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(3) 
For- 
profits  
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Matching 
  
College Costs and Financial Aid, 2003-2004 
Applied for aid  0.895  0.749  0.986  0.094  0.072 
       (0.010)  (0.011) 
Title IV loan and grant aid  3,837 1,022 6,852 4,439 3,417 
       (183)  (164) 
Tuition 9,230  1,269  8,434 5,632 5,108 
       (173)  (201) 
Net tuition minus grants  5,183  734  5,573  4,521  4,418 
       (157)  (158) 
Pell  grant  0.285 0.294 0.790 0.190 0.061 
       (0.014)  (0.020) 
Pell grant amount  771  633  2,149  557  180 
       (48)  (68) 
  Financial Aid through 2009 
Cumulative Pell grant  2,923  2,399  4,084  -170  -852 
       (146)  (223) 
Cumulative Title IV borrowing  8,702 3,502 7,699 3,960 2,239 
       (421)  (381) 
Title IV loan balance in 2009  8,024 3,306 7460 4,071 2,242 
       (460)  (401) 
Repaid any amount on loan,  0.642  0.640  0.529  -0.093  -0.040 
conditional on a student loan        (0.029)  (0.046) 
Defaulted on loan,  0.035  0.056  0.188  0.067  0.082 
conditional on a student loan        (0.018)  (0.018) 
 
Sample Size 
 
8,760 
 
5,970 
 
1,950 
  
 
Source: BPS:04/09 Restricted-Use Data File.   
Notes: The OLS column reports coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) for a for-profit institution 
dummy variable in regressions for each dependent variable that include the following covariates: dummy 
variables for race, sex, citizenship, born in the US, parents born in the US, English as the native language, 
household size, distance of school from home, lives with parents, marital status, single parenthood, 
independent student, number of kids, use of child care, maternal and paternal education categories, high 
school diploma, GED receipt, delayed enrollment after HS, certificate or degree program, degree 
expectations, region, and on or off campus residence; and second order polynomials in age, prior income -30- 
 
(own for independent students and family for dependent students), household income percent of the 
poverty line, expected family contribution from the FAFSA, individual adjusted gross income from tax 
returns and government transfers.  Each number in the Matching column represents the average treatment 
on the treated estimate (standard error) for going to a for-profit institution using from nearest neighbor 
(propensity score) matching with replacement and excluding observations outside of common support.  
The same covariates used in the OLS regressions were used for the matching models.  The OLS and 
Matching model estimates use the BPS sampling weights. Unweighted sample sizes are rounded to the 
nearest 10. -31- 
 
Table 3: Differences in Student Outcomes between For-Profit Institutions and Other Schools for 
First-Time Undergraduates: 2004/2009 Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study 
  Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS, full sample) 
Dependent Variables  Dependent Variable Means    For-Profit Institution 
Impact 
 (1) 
Four-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(2) 
Two-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(3) 
For- 
profits  
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Matching 
  Persistence and Educational Attainment 
Left school in 2003-2004  0.062  0.233  0.212  -0.046  -0.051 
       (0.016)  (0.018) 
Attained certificate  –  0.424 0.537 0.086 0.046 
(enrolled in certificate program)        (0.036)  (0.034) 
Attained AA    0.224 0.284 0.041 0.019 
(enrolled in AA program)       (0.028)  (0.029) 
Attained AA or more  –  0.283 0.291 -0.006  -0.016 
(enrolled in AA program)        (0.028)  (0.030) 
Attained BA  0.658  –  0.262 -0.115 -0.194 
(enrolled in BA program)        (0.045)  (0.052) 
Idle (not employed, not enrolled)   0.106  0.133  0.236  0.052  0.058 
at 2009 survey        (0.017)  (0.017) 
Enrolled in 2009  0.271  0.389  0.216  -0.114  -0.080 
       (0.018)  (0.019) 
  
  Employment and Earnings (for those no longer enrolled in 2009) 
Any job in 2009  0.839  0.784  0.706  -0.028  -0.031 
       (0.021)  (0.022) 
Earnings from work in 2009  28,613  24,795  19,950  -1,771  -1,936 
       (931)  (950) 
Earnings from work in 2009,  34,080  31,622  28,243  -1,355  -243 
conditional on employment        (934)  (937) 
Unemployed and seeking work  0.121 0.148 0.232 0.048 0.067 
       (0.019)  (0.020) 
Unemployed 3 months or more   0.238  0.259  0.404  0.077  0.084 
after leaving school        (0.022)  (0.023) 
Earnings less than   0.135 0.046 0.271 0.194 0.147 
gainful employment standard        (0.019)  (0.017) 
  
  Course Content and Job and School Satisfaction  
Remedial coursework in 2003-4  0.181  0.289  0.076  -0.180  -0.187 
       (0.015)  (0.017) 
Left school because dissatisfied  0.012 0.024 0.081 0.043 0.048 
(2003-2004)       (0.009)  (0.009) 
Left school because dissatisfied  0.032  0.051  0.117 0.052 0.053 
(2003-2006)       (0.013)  (0.011) 
Education was worth the cost  0.802  0.821  0.648  -0.204  -0.179 
       (0.019)  (0.017) -32- 
 
Loans were a worthwhile   0.836  0.803  0.664  -0.143  -0.121 
investment       (0.022)  (0.024) 
Satisfied with major or program  0.860  0.871  0.789  -0.097  -0.065 
       (0.017)  (0.015) 
Satisfied with current job,   0.772  0.764  0.752  -0.011  -0.032 
(employed, not enrolled)        (0.025)  (0.023) 
 
Sample Size 
 
8,760 
 
5,970 
 
1,950 
  
 
Source and Notes: See Table 2.   -33- 
 
Appendix 
IPEDS and student financial aid 
We have constructed a consistent institution-year panel data set using the 2000 to 2009 
micro data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) collected and 
maintained by the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education.  
We use the IPEDS data on enrollments (fall, 12 month, and full-time equivalent), degrees and 
awards, tuition, revenues and expenditures, and other institutional characteristics.  The IPEDS 
data are available from and documented at http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/. 
We match the IPEDS data to institution-level data on Pell grants, student loans volumes 
and cohort default rates from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS).  For the 
financial data, see: http://federalstudentaid.ed.gov/datacenter/index.html. 
Student loan volumes by institution come from the Direct Loan program (where the 
federal government gives loans directly to students) and the Federal Family Education Loan 
(FFEL) Program, and includes both subsidized (where the government pays interest while 
students are still enrolled in school) and unsubsidized loan programs. Under FFELP, private 
lenders provided capital for loans that were subsidized and guaranteed against default by the 
federal government. The FFEL program was terminated in 2009. 
Institutions in IPEDS are assigned a unique “unitid” that is constant across years.  Unitids 
are assigned to physical branches of an institution, and a single school will have one unitid for 
each branch. However, each school is also assigned an Office of Postsecondary Education ID 
(known as “opeid”) that is constant across branches.  The NSLDS data are linked to the opeid 
and are not broken out separately by branch.  For example, IPEDS has enrollment and degree 
information separated by campus branch (i.e., by unitid), but information from NSLDS on 
student loan and Pell grant volumes is only available for the overall institution (i.e., the opeid).  
Match rate between IPEDS and NSLDS 
We are able to match about 94 percent of the unitids in IPEDS to an opeid from NSLDS.  
Around 67 percent of the schools are classified in IPEDS as for-profit institutions.  The 
unmatched 6 percent of schools (722 of 11,889) contain 1.4 percent of total enrollment in 2009 
and less in earlier years. 
We were unable to match about 5.6 percent of the opeids in NSLDS to any IPEDS unitid.  
About 61 percent (405 of 661) of those institutions were classified by NSLDS as “proprietary” 
schools, or for-profits.  Schools without unitids are about 1 percent of subsidized and 
unsubsidized loan volumes in 2009 and about 2.4 percent of Pell Grants.  Among proprietary 
schools, those that were not successfully matched to IPEDS represent less than 1 percent of loans 
and about 1 percent of Pell grants.-34- 
 
Appendix Table 1: Regression of Three-Year Cohort Default Rate on Type of Institution: 2005 to 2008 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Non-profit four year  -0.015  -0.006  0.001  0.002  0.000  -0.015  -0.007  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
Community college  0.063  0.049  0.046  0.030  0.046  0.063  0.047  0.045  0.030  0.044 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
For-profit  0.110  0.105  0.105  0.087  0.105           
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.004)           
For-profit × 2008          0.005           
          (0.007)           
Independents            0.102  0.096  0.098  0.080  0.098 
            (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Independents × 2008                    -0.013 
                    (0.010) 
Regional chain            0.123  0.113  0.111  0.091  0.110 
            (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Regional chain × 2008                    0.011 
                    (0.015) 
National chain            0.152  0.131  0.127  0.108  0.124 
            (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
National chain × 2008                    0.032 
                    (0.008) 
On-line            0.079  0.076  0.089  0.075  0.081 
            (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
On-line × 2008                    0.059 
                    (0.020) 
R-squared  0.295  0.428  0.642  0.553  0.642  0.305  0.433  0.644  0.555  0.645 
Sample Size  14,655  14,655  14,655  9,281  14,655  14,655  14,655  14,655  9,281  14,655 
Demographic controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Financial aid controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Degree types, offerings  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Limit to open admission  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
 -35- 
 
Source: National Student Loan Data System and IPEDS. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the three-year cohort default rate for an institution-year observation.  The sample covers institution-
year observations for the fiscal years 2005 to 2008.  “Independents” are for-profit schools that operate in only one state and have no 
more than five branches. A “regional chain” is a for-profit institution that operates in more than one state, or has more than five 
campus branches within a single state, but operates in no more than two census divisions.  A “national chain” is a for-profit institution 
that operates in at least three separate census divisions.  A for-profit institution is “online” if it either has the word “online” in the 
school’s name, or if no more than 33 percent of its students come from any single U.S. state.  Demographic controls are fractions part-
time, 25 years and over, female, African American, and Hispanic.  Financial aid controls are the number of recipients of Pell grants 
and subsidized and unsubsidized federal loans, total yearly disbursement amounts for each, and total loans and Pell grants per enrollee.  
Degree types and offerings are indicators for distance education, remedial course offerings, whether the institution offers assistance 
with job placement, whether it offers part-time employment services for enrolled students, the highest award or degree offered by the 
institution, and whether it has open admissions.  Standard errors are clustered by institution and are in parentheses.  Omitted category 
is four-year public.-36- 
 
Appendix Table 2: For-Profit Institution Impact on Student Outcomes for First-Time Undergraduates at 
Non-Selective Institutions: BPS:04/09  
  Beginning Postsecondary Students, Non-selective Institutions 
 
Dependent Variable Means    For-Profit Institution 
Impact 
Dependent Variables 
(1) 
Four-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(2) 
Two-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(3) 
For- profits 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Matching 
  Financial Aid, 2003-2004 
Applied  for  Aid  0.905  0.749 0.986  0.092 0.056 
       (0.010)  (0.011) 
Title IV loan and grant aid  3,989 1,022  6,852 4,628  3,567 
       (179)  (156) 
Tuition 6,737  1,269  8,434 5,979  5,243 
       (160)  (176) 
Net tuition minus grants  3,457  734  5,573  4,660  4,351 
       (148)  (143) 
Pell  grant  0.407  0.294 0.790  0.190 0.053 
       (0.014)  (0.021) 
Pell grant amount  1,092  633  2,149  570  195 
       (49)  (68) 
  Financial Aid through 2009 
Cumulative Pell grant  3,545  2,399  4,084  100  -657 
       (145)  (212) 
Cumulative Title IV borrowing  8,489 3,502  7,699 4,562  2,781 
       (417)  (354) 
Title IV loan balance, 2009  8,153 3,306  7,460 4,640  2,759 
       (449)  (371) 
Repaid any amount on loan,  0.588 0.640  0.529  -0.098  -0.033 
conditional on a student loan       (0.030)  (0.044) 
Defaulted on loan,  0.073  0.056 0.188  0.058 0.078 
conditional on a student loan       (0.018)  (0.019) 
  Persistence and Educational Attainment 
Left school in 2003-2004  0.134  0.233  0.212  -0.053  -0.054 
       (0.016)  (0.018) 
Attained  certificate  0.031  0.112 0.316  0.038 0.043 
       (0.014)  (0.19) 
Attained AA  0.071  0.177  0.112  -0.043  -0.021 
       (0.015)  (0.015) 
Attained BA  0.532  0.110  0.040  -0.049  -0.044 
       (0.011)  (0.012) 
Still enrolled in 2009  0.336  0.389 0.216  -0.118  -0.098 
       (0.018)  (0.020) 
Idle (not employed, not enrolled)  0.132  0.133  0.236  0.046  0.056 
       (0.017)  (0.017) 
Left survey  0.113  0.109  0.064  -0.024  -0.020 
       (0.011)  (0.012) -37- 
 
  Employment and Earnings (conditional on no longer enrolled) 
Any job in 2009  0.790  0.784  0.706  -0.020  -0.093 
       (0.021)  (0.021) 
Earnings from work in 2009  24,626  24,795  19,950  -1237  -4168 
       (967)  (970) 
Earnings from work in 2009,  31,188  31,622  28,243  -885  234 
conditional on employment        (969)  (902) 
Unemployed and seeking work  0.164 0.148  0.232 0.041  0.062 
       (0.019)  (0.021) 
Unemployed more than 3 months   0.277  0.259  0.404  0.078  0.085 
since leaving school        (0.022)  (0.024) 
Earnings do not meet the   0.156  0.046  0.271  0.204  0.152 
Gainful Employment standard        (0.019)  (0.017) 
  Satisfaction with Program, School, Loans, Job 
Remedial coursework  0.235  0.289  0.076  -0.196  -0.198 
         (0.015)  (0.017) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.036  0.024  0.081 0.038  0.039 
2003-2004       (0.009)  (0.009) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.073  0.051  0.117 0.046  0.048 
2003-2006       (0.013)  (0.011) 
Education was worth the cost  0.771  0.821  0.648  -0.204  -0.179 
       (0.019)  (0.018) 
Loans were a worthwhile   0.804  0.803  0.664  -0.142  -0.118 
Investment       (0.023)  (0.024) 
Satisfied with major   0.846  0.871  0.789  -0.101  -0.070 
or course of study        (0.017)  (0.015) 
Satisfied with current job   0.772  0.764  0.752  -0.014  -0.011 
(employed, not enrolled)        (0.026)  (0.024) 
 
Sample size  1,920  5,930  1,950     
 
Source: BPS:04/09 Restricted-Use Data File.   
Notes: The regression samples exclude students who started at selective four-year institutions. The OLS 
column reports coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) for a for-profit institution dummy variable in 
regressions for each dependent variable that include the same additional covariates as those listed in the 
notes to Table 3.  Each number in the Matching column represents the average treatment on the treated 
estimate (standard error) for going to a for-profit institution using from nearest neighbor (propensity 
score) matching with replacement and excluding observations outside of common support.  The same 
covariates used in the OLS regressions were used for the matching models. The OLS and Matching model 
estimates use the BPS sampling weights. Unweighted sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10. -38- 
 
Appendix Table 3: For-Profit Institution Impact on Student Outcomes for First-Time Undergraduates in 
Certificate Programs: BPS:04/09  
 
  Beginning Postsecondary Students, Certificate Program Enrollees 
 
Dependent Variable Means    For-Profit Institution 
Impact 
Dependent Variables 
(1) 
Four-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(2) 
Two-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(3) 
For- profits 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Matching 
  Financial Aid, 2003-2004 
Applied  for  Aid  0.883  0.836 0.991  0.069 0.068 
       (0.014)  (0.020) 
Title IV loan and grant aid  3,693 1,362  6,285 3,353  3,005 
       (252)  (238) 
Tuition 7,171  1,425  8,129  5243  4979 
       (176)  (276) 
Net tuition minus grants  4,227  757  5,212  4,023  3,911 
       (242)  (242) 
Pell  grant  0.465  0.409 0.888  0.191 0.061 
       (0.023)  (0.033) 
Pell grant amount  1,272  785  2,480  583  264 
       (78)  (105) 
  Financial Aid through 2009 
Cumulative Pell grant  2,961  2,127  3,780  41  -734 
       (220)  (265) 
Cumulative Title IV borrowing  5,019  2,033  4,599  1702  1119 
       (331)  (404) 
Title IV loan balance, 2009  4,471  1,884  3,975  1326  847 
       (349)  (418) 
Repaid any amount on loan,  0.593 0.622  0.604  -0.019  0.134 
conditional on a student loan       (0.063)  (0.090) 
Defaulted on loan,  0.073  0.113 0.234  0.084 0.098 
conditional on a student loan       (0.045)  (0.037) 
  Persistence and Educational Attainment 
Left school in 2003-2004  0.240  0.355  0.288  -0.020  -0.071 
       (0.032)  (0.032) 
Attained  certificate  0.227  0.424 0.537  0.086 0.046 
       (0.036)  (0.034) 
Attained AA  0.296  0.076  0.017  -0.085  -0.065 
       (0.017)  (0.019) 
Still enrolled in 2009  0.319  0.261 0.206  -0.035  -0.079 
       (0.031)  (0.029) 
Idle (not employed, not enrolled)  0.178  0.166  0.269  0.064  0.051 
       (0.030)  (0.029) 
Left survey  0.040  0.067  0.040  -0.022  -0.026 
       (0.014)  (0.015) -39- 
 
  
  Employment and Earnings (conditional on no longer enrolled) 
Any job in 2009  0.711  0.779  0.669  -0.065  -0.100 
       (0.036)  (0.033) 
Earnings from work in 2009  22,652  24,138  17,471  -3,041  -3,584 
       (1490)  (1422) 
Earnings from work in 2009,  31,873  30,967  26,119  -1,576  -2,473 
conditional on employment        (1414)  (1520) 
Unemployed and seeking work  0.250 0.144  0.256 0.055  0.121 
       (0.033)  (0.032) 
Unemployed more than 3 months   0.415  0.271  0.439  0.079  0.086 
since leaving school        (0.039)  (0.038) 
Earnings do not meet the   0.092  0.031  0.229  0.130  0.146 
Gainful Employment standard        (0.025)  (0.023) 
  Satisfaction with Program, School, Loans, Job 
Remedial coursework  0.206  0.244  0.049  -0.198  -0.199 
       (0.026)  (0.027) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.060  0.033  0.100 0.065  0.064 
2003-2004       (0.018)  (0.013) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.084  0.067  0.122 0.060  0.066 
2003-2006       (0.023)  (0.015) 
Education was worth the cost  0.798  0.878  0.712  -0.230  -0.221 
       (0.030)  (0.028) 
Loans were a worthwhile   0.823  0.806  0.680  -0.109  -0.192 
Investment       (0.038)  (0.040) 
Satisfied with major   0.870  0.913  0.823  -0.074  -0.063 
or course of study        (0.022)  (0.023) 
Satisfied with current job   0.691  0.816  0.777  -0.013  -0.083 
(employed, not enrolled)        (0.042)  (0.035) 
 
Sample size  230  890  1,130     
 
Source: BPS:04/09 Restricted-Use Data File.   
Notes: The regression sample only includes BPS students originally enrolled in a certificate program. The 
OLS column reports coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) for a for-profit institution dummy 
variable in regressions for each dependent variable that include the same additional covariates as those 
listed in the notes to Table 3.  Each number in the Matching column represents the average treatment on 
the treated estimate (standard error) for going to a for-profit institution using from nearest neighbor 
(propensity score) matching with replacement and excluding observations outside of common support.  
The same covariates used in the OLS regressions were used for the matching models. The OLS and 
Matching model estimates use the BPS sampling weights. Unweighted sample sizes are rounded to the 
nearest 10. -40- 
 
Appendix Table 4: For-Profit Institution Impact on Student Outcomes for First-Time Undergraduates in 
Associate’s Programs: BPS:04/09 
  Beginning Postsecondary Students, Associate’s Program Enrollees 
 
Dependent Variable Means    For-Profit Institution 
Impact 
Dependent Variables 
(1) 
Four-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(2) 
Two-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(3) 
For- profits 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Matching 
  Financial Aid, 2003-2004 
Applied  for  Aid  0.911  0.770 0.983  0.108 0.077 
       (0.015)  (0.015) 
Title IV loan and grant aid  4,372 1,031  7,296 5,089  4,423 
       (247)  (254) 
Tuition 6,883  1,301  8,500 6,301  5,693 
       (254)  (281) 
Net tuition minus grants  3,829  745  5,798  4,885  4,795 
       (234)  (247) 
Pell  grant  0.433  0.311 0.717  0.188 0.072 
       (0.022)  (0.031) 
Pell grant amount  1,101  664  1,862  494  110 
       (72)  (103) 
  Financial Aid through 2009 
Cumulative Pell grant  3,440  2,615  4,537  125  -318 
       (201)  (331) 
Cumulative Title IV borrowing  8,145 3,683  10,657 5,891  5,214 
       (639)  (558) 
Title IV loan balance, 2009  7,854 3,467  10,888 6,309  5,615 
       (675)  (612) 
Repaid any amount on loan,  0.547 0.644  0.432  -0.142  -0.080 
conditional on a student loan       (0.039)  (0.044) 
Defaulted on loan,  0.074  0.052 0.152  0.073 0.053 
conditional on a student loan       (0.022)  (0.022) 
  Persistence and Educational Attainment 
Left school in 2003-2004  0.138  0.217  0.121  -0.083  -0.095 
       (0.020)  (0.024) 
Attained  AA    0.224 0.284  0.041 0.019 
       (0.028)  (0.029) 
Attained AA or more    0.283  0.291  -0.006  -0.016 
       (0.028)  (0.030) 
Attained BA  0.238  0.106  0.034  -0.073  -0.068 
       (0.014)  (0.017) 
Still enrolled in 2009  0.238  0.106 0.034  -0.073  -0.068 
       (0.014)  (0.017) 
Idle (not employed, not enrolled)  0.138  0.122  0.199  0.037  0.046 
       (0.025)  (0.025) 
Left survey  0.351  0.400  0.234  -0.145  -0.110 
       (0.028)  (0.030) -41- 
 
  
  Employment and Earnings (conditional on no longer enrolled) 
Any job in 2009  0.789  0.797  0.749  0.002  -0.043 
       (0.032)  (0.031) 
Earnings from work in 2009  25,867  25,232  21,413  -1,880  -552 
       (1449)  (1423) 
Earnings from work in 2009,  32,786  31,673  28,593  -2,794  -542 
conditional on employment        (1476)  (1657) 
Unemployed and seeking work  0.162 0.136  0.205 0.035  0.087 
       (0.029)  (0.029) 
Unemployed more than 3 months   0.270  0.260  0.373  0.084  0.045 
since leaving school        (0.035)  (0.036) 
Earnings do not meet the   0.187  0.050  0.340  0.256  0.176 
Gainful Employment standard        (0.031)  (0.030) 
  Satisfaction with Program, School, Loans, Job 
Remedial coursework  0.248  0.307  0.106  -0.178  -0.191 
       (0.022)  (0.026) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.039  0.022  0.058 0.023  0.016 
2003-2004       (0.012)  (0.013) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.074  0.049  0.108 0.045  0.053 
2003-2006       (0.019)  (0.017) 
Education was worth the cost  0.789  0.807  0.571  -0.230  -0.221 
       (0.030)  (0.028) 
Loans were a worthwhile   0.810  0.792  0.641  -0.155  -0.079 
Investment       (0.031)  (0.031) 
Satisfied with major   0.849  0.859  0.742  -0.120  -0.088 
or course of study        (0.028)  (0.025) 
Satisfied with current job   0.794  0.751  0.704  -0.033  -0.030 
(employed, not enrolled)        (0.040)  (0.037) 
 
Sample size  870  3,720  570     
 
Source: BPS:04/09 Restricted-Use Data File.   
Notes: The regression sample only includes BPS students originally enrolled in an associate’s degree 
program. The OLS column reports coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) for a for-profit institution 
dummy variable in regressions for each dependent variable that include the same additional covariates as 
those listed in the notes to Table 3.  Each number in the Matching column represents the average 
treatment on the treated estimate (standard error) for going to a for-profit institution using from nearest 
neighbor (propensity score) matching with replacement and excluding observations outside of common 
support.  The same covariates used in the OLS regressions were used for the matching models. The OLS 
and Matching model estimates use the BPS sampling weights. Unweighted sample sizes are rounded to 
the nearest 10. -42- 
 
Appendix Table 5: For-Profit Institution Impact on Student Outcomes for First-Time Undergraduates in 
Bachelor’s Programs: BPS:04/09 
  Beginning Postsecondary Students, Bachelor’s Program Enrollees 
 
Dependent Variable Means    For-Profit Institution 
Impact 
Dependent Variables 
(1) 
Four-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(2) 
Two-Year 
Public and 
Non-profits 
(3) 
For- profits 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Matching 
  Financial Aid, 2003-2004 
Applied  for  Aid  0.897  0.754 0.989  0.123 0.111 
       (0.019)  (0.028) 
Title IV loan and grant aid  3,837 1,227  8,518 5,199  3,505 
       (692)  (641) 
Tuition 9,680  1,494  10,060 5,084  2,205 
       (475)  (795) 
Net tuition minus grants  5,415  918  6,741  4,464  3,498 
       (520)  (600) 
Pell grant  0.268  0.274  0.564  0.112  -0.028 
       (0.031)  (0.056) 
Pell grant amount  733  631  1535  319  -173 
       (111)  (176) 
  Financial Aid through 2009 
Cumulative Pell grant  2,903  2,398  4,257  -358  -1,067 
       (412)  (608) 
Cumulative Title IV borrowing  8,993 4,483  13,750 4,744  3,222 
       (1262)  (1383) 
Title IV loan balance, 2009  8,273 4,284  13,924 5,240  3,439 
       (1392)  (1503) 
Repaid any amount on loan,  0.652 0.638  0.476  -0.138  -0.189 
conditional on a student loan       (0.062)  (0.075) 
Defaulted on loan,  0.029 0.058  0.092  0.020  -0.013 
conditional on a student loan       (0.036)  (0.034) 
  Persistence and Educational Attainment 
Left school in 2003-2004  0.043  0.151  0.108  -0.020  -0.028 
       (0.032)  (0.036) 
Attained BA  0.658  0.203  0.262  -0.115  -0.194 
       (0.045)  (0.052) 
Still enrolled in 2009  0.257  0.409 0.222  -0.142  -0.022 
       (0.041)  (0.050) 
Idle (not employed, not enrolled)  0.099  0.112  0.199  0.088  0.072 
       (0.039)  (0.045) 
Left survey  0.109  0.146  0.116  -0.016  -0.028 
       (0.034)  (0.038) 
  
  Employment and Earnings (conditional on no longer enrolled) 
Any job in 2009  0.852  0.821  0.749  -0.078  -0.069 
       (0.046)  (0.055) -43- 
 
Earnings from work in 2009  29,434  25,130  28,159  500  -1,065 
       (2629)  (2723) 
Earnings from work in 2009,  34,528  30,617  37,578  3,471  1,014 
conditional on employment        (2707)  (2685) 
Unemployed and seeking work  0.110 0.142  0.223 0.091  0.136 
       (0.044)  (0.049) 
Unemployed more than 3 months   0.227  0.255  0.353  0.098  0.047 
since leaving school        (0.052)  (0.051) 
Earnings do not meet the   0.131  0.060  0.298  0.157  0.183 
Gainful Employment standard        (0.051)  (0.055) 
  Satisfaction with Program, School, Loans, Job 
Remedial coursework  0.167  0.295  0.122  -0.098  -0.128 
       (0.033)  (0.043) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.007  0.020  0.046 0.025  0.033 
2003-2004       (0.019)  (0.019) 
Left school because dissatisfied,  0.026  0.038  0.101 0.060  0.072 
2003-2006       (0.029)  (0.025) 
Education was worth the cost  0.806  0.799  0.581  -0.207  -0.167 
       (0.048)  (0.050) 
Loans were a worthwhile   0.843  0.819  0.685  -0.133  -0.058 
Investment       (0.049)  (0.053) 
Satisfied with major   0.862  0.898  0.776  -0.089  -0.067 
or course of study        (0.045)  (0.039) 
Satisfied with current job   0.776  0.772  0.787  0.057  -0.011 
(employed, not enrolled)        (0.053)  (0.069) 
 
Sample size  7,180  650  180     
 
Source: BPS:04/09 Restricted-Use Data File.   
Notes: The regression sample only includes BPS students originally enrolled in a bachelor’s degree 
program. The OLS column reports coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) for a for-profit institution 
dummy variable in regressions for each dependent variable that include the same additional covariates as 
those listed in the notes to Table 3.  Each number in the Matching column represents the average 
treatment on the treated estimate (standard error) for going to a for-profit institution using from nearest 
neighbor (propensity score) matching with replacement and excluding observations outside of common 
support.  The same covariates used in the OLS regressions were used for the matching models. The OLS 
and Matching model estimates use the BPS sampling weights.  Unweighted sample sizes are rounded to 
the nearest 10. 
 